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DEFAULT PROCEEDINGS UNDER ARTICLE 9:
PROBLEMS, SOLUTIONS, AND LESSONS
TO BE LEARNED
LEONARD LAKIN*
INTRODUCTION
on the subject of secured transactions
(Uniform Commercial Code, Article Nine) has been concerned
with the creation -and perfection of security interests in collateral and with
the Uniform Commercial Code's (hereinafter "the Code") provisions
which relate to the resolution of the conflicting security interests. The
Code, in validating the increasing variety of secured transactions in today's
business world, recognizes that collateral is the medium of credit as money
is the medium of exchange. Article 9 effectuates the Code's policy which
recognizes that the secured transaction is a vital and necessary component
in today's credit economy by providing the mechanism that gives to the
secured party a definite, special and exclusive interest in the debtor's
property to secure the payment of the debtor's obligation.' Fortunately for
our economy and our lenders, borrowers, sellers, and buyers, the problem
of the defaulting debtor and the consequent need of the secured party to
make himself "whole" by seizing and disposing of the debtor's collateral
occurs relatively infrequently,2 considering the annual number of secured
transactions and the hundreds of billions of dollars of secured transactions
concluded each year. Yet, the dollar amount of consumer and commercial
secured transactions and the number of consumer and business debtors
adjudicated bankrupt each year compel any student of secured transactions
to become fully familiar with those Article 9 Code provisions that govern
the rights, duties and remedies of the secured party upon the debtor's
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default as well as his liability to the debtor for noncompliance with
the Code's requirements.
The Code has two policy objectives in establishing the rules that
govern the rights and duties of the secured party and debtor after default.
The first objective is to obtain the highest possible price upon the disposition of the collateral. This is accomplished by giving the secured party
substantial discretion and flexibility in disposing of the collateral, whether
by private or public disposition, provided he acts in a "commercially
reasonable" manner. The second objective is to increase the ability of a
court of law to review the conduct of the secured party before and after
any disposition to insure that the disposition of the collateral will be
made, or in fact was made, in a commercially reasonable manner.
This article will explore in detail the relevant Code provisions
relating to default proceedings and the impact of the significant court
decisions which have interpreted this most important area of secured
transactions as well as the changes made by -the 1972 Official Text of
Article 9, which has already been adopted in ten states as of this writing.3
WHEN A DEFAULT OCCURS

Article 9 does not specify when a debtor is in default under a security
agreement. Nor is the term "default" defined in the Code. Therefore, the
security agreement 4 must state when the debtor is in default. 5 The security
agreement will always provide that a default occurs upon the happening of
any of certain specified events. The one event universally recited as an
event of default is the failure of the debtor to make a payment which is
due under the security agreement. Other customary events of default
which are generally provided for in the security agreement are: failure to
insure the collateral as required under the security agreement; unauthorized
removal, sale or disposition of any collateral; legal seizure of any collateral
by third parties; the breach of any representation or warranty made by the
debtor to the secured party in the security agreement; death or dissolution
3

In April, 1972, the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the two organizations having responsibility for
drafting the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE) published what was called the 1972 Official
Text of Article 9. States adopting the 1972 Official Text of Article 9 are Arkansas,
Illinois, Iowa, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia and
Wisconsin. For effective dates of adopting states see 1 CCH SEc. TRANs. GumE
4,006 (1974).
4

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-105(1) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.]
a
"security agreement" as "an agreement which creates or provides for adefines
security
interest."

5Since the U.C.C. does not define the term default, the parties are free to do so.

Borochoff Properties, Inc. v. Howard Lumber Co., 116 Ga. App. 691, 696, 155 S.E.2d
651, 654 (1967). This accords with the general principle of freedom of contract in
U.C.C. § 1-102(3), which allows the parties to define their rights, liabilities and duties
subject, however, to the standards of good faith and rmasqnablenqss set forth in tha

section and in sections !-203 and 1-20 ,
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of the debtor; insolvency of the debtor; appointment of a receiver;
assignment for the benefit of creditors, or a bankruptcy proceeding.
Furthermore, when the secured debt is to be repaid in installments,
the security agreement will usually contain an acceleration clause which
provides that if the debtor defaults by not making any required payment
or if any other specified event of default occurs, then all sums due and
owing by the debtor under the security agreement become immediately
due and payable at the option of the secured party.6 However, the
secured party does not have to exercise his option upon default. There
is no concomitant duty owing by the secured party to other creditors of
the debtor to declare the debtor in default.
Thus, in a New York case,7 petitioner, a secured lender, successfully
vacated an execution levy made by unsecured creditors of the debtor
against the secured lender's collateral. The unsecured creditors contended
in a novel argument that a secured lender whose loan is repayable on
demand owes a duty to unsecured merchandise creditors to demand
repayment and to foreclose on his lien at the first instance the secured
lender has cause to believe that the debtor cannot immediately repay the
loan. The court rejected this argument and sustained the security interest
of the secured lender. While acceleration clauses are commonplace in
security agreements, those who loan money secured by a security interest
in a debtor's inventory (which might include raw materials and
work-in-process) often elect to postpone accelerating the due date of
the loan. For example, when the collateral consists of substantial
work-in-process, the secured party may elect to postpone declaring a
default or accelerating the loan while he continues to advance additional
money to the defaulting debtor to enable him to convert relatively
valueless work-in-process to much more valuable finished inventory. While
the secured party has a right to complete the work-in-process after
foreclosing on its security interest, 8 it is often to the secured party's
advantage to have the debtor complete the work-in-process since he has
the available labor pool, machinery and technical skill.
It is also common practice to provide in the security agreement that
the secured party may accelerate payment or performance, or require
additional collateral "at will," or "when he deems himself insecure."
Obviously, this right could be abused by the secured party. Consequently,
under pre-Code law a number of states declared such clauses void as
against public policy. However, the Code expressly permits.such a clause
in a security agreement, but provides in Section '1-208 that the clause
U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (m) defines a secured party as "a lender, seller or other person in
whose favor there is a security interest..."
T William Iselin & Co. v. Burghess & Leigh Ltd., 52 Misc. 2d 821, 276 N.Y.S.2d 659
(Sup. Ct. 1967).
8 U.C.C. § 9-504(1).
6
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shall be construed to mean that he shall have power
if he in good faith believes that the prospect of
performance is impaired. The burden of establishing
faith is on the party against whom the power has been
...
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to do so only
payment or
lack of good
exercised.

Thus, a debtor who objects to such an acceleration requiring immediate and full payment has the burden of establishing lack of good faith on
the part of the secured party. In Code terms the burden of establishing any
fact is said to mean "the burden of persuading the triers of fact that the
existence of the fact is more probable than its non-existence." 9 The
requirement of "good faith" is a golden thread woven into the entire fabric
of the Uniform Commercial Code. 10 Good faith is defined as "honesty in
fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."" To insure that the secured
party is acting in "good faith" and not frivolously, the Code provides for
judicial review of the conduct of the secured party.12
THE SECURED PARTY'S RIGHT TO POSSESS COLLATERAL
AFTER THE DEBTOR'S DEFAULT
Upon the debtor's default,' 3 the first important right that the secured
party usually wants to exercise is to take possession of the collateral as
promptly as possible. 14 It is at this time that the risk is greatest that the
debtor will wrongfully dispose of the collateral or that other trade creditors
or the government will seize the collateral to satisfy their respective
claims. Therefore, the right of the secured party to obtain possession of
the debtor's collateral after default is the cornerstone of all his subsequent
rights.Y5 Indeed, the secured party's legal right to possession after default
is a meaningless scholasticism if he cannot take possession of the collateral
after default. 16 The Code recognizes the historic principle 17 of self-help
9U.C.C. § 1-201(8); Fort Knox Nat'l Bank v. Gustafson, 385 S.W.2d 196 (Ky. Ct.

App. 1964).
10Id. See Stankiewicz, Good Faith Obligation in the Uniform Commercial Code:
Problems in Determining Its Meaning and Evaluating Its Effect, 7 VAL. L. REV. 389

(1973).
11 U.C.C. § 1-201(19).
12 U.C.C. § 9-507.
13 Supra note 5.
14 The U.C.C. does not, however, require the secured party to repossess the collateral
before suing the debtor. Bank of Cal. Nat'l Ass'n v. Leone, 37 Cal. App. 3d 444, 112
Cal. Rptr. 394 (1974); Walker v. Community Bank, 107 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Ct. App.

1973); American Emp. Ins. Co. v. Piedmont Sewing Supply, Inc., 287 So. 2d 111
(Fla. Ct. App. 1973); Hurt v. Citizens Trust Co., 128 Ga. App. 224, 196 S.E.2d 349
(1973); Duesler v. State Bank, 348 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1973). However, once the
secured party elects upon debtor's default to proceed under the U.C.C. by repossessing
and disposing of the collateral, he must comply with the applicable Code provisions.
Htldner v. Fox, 17 Ill. App. 3d 97, 308 N.E.2d 301 (1974).
15 Where a debtor has not defaulted under the terms of the security agreement,
however, a secured party cannot lawfully seize and dispose of the debtor's collateral.
See U.C.C. § 9-501(1).
App. 3d 97, 308 N.E.2d 301 (1974).
16 Hildner v. Fox, 17 M11
17 3 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *4, where Blackstone states:
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by giving the secured party the right to take possession of the collateral
after default without judicial process provided it can be done without
breach of the peace.' 8 Moreover, the secured party may take peaceable
possession of the collateral on default without the consent, and even
over the protest, of the debtor.19
20
Thus the Code, following the pre-Code law, provides in Section
9-503: "Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right
to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party
may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach
of the peace or may proceed by action .. "

Interestingly, Article 9 does not set -forth any standards to determine
whether or when a secured party may take possession of the collateral
without a breach of the peace. However, the Code does provide that if
he takes possession by committing a breach of the peace he not only
2
subjects himself to criminal and to ordinary tort liability ' but he also
becomes liable to the debtor for "any loss caused by a failure to comply
' 22
with the provisions of this part." In this respect the secured party may
not exert wrongful pressure against the debtor to obtain possession of the
collateral. He has no right to use force or coercion and enjoys no
immunity. He acts at his peril, and exposes himself to severe potential
liability, including liability for punitive damages.23
Recaption or reprisal is another species of remedy by the mere act of the party
injured. This happens when any one hath deprived another of his property in
goods or chattels personal .... in which case the owner of the goods... may
lawfully claim and retake them wherever he happens to find them, so it be not
in a riotous manner or attended with a breach of the peace.
18 U.C.C. § 9-503.
19 Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cole, 503 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. 1973).
20 UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT §§ 16, 17; UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 6.
21 If the secured party repossesses without any claim of right he may be sued for
conversion. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 79-97 (4th ed. 1971).
Moreover, if methods used in self-help repossession are patently offensive to the
debtor, he may recover damages from the secured party resulting from defamation,
abuse of process or intentional infliction of mental distress. Id. at 57. Texas has even
recognized the distinct tort of unreasonable collection. See Note, Effectively Regulating
ExtrajudicialCollection of Debts, 20 Ma. L. REv.261, 271-73 (1968).
22 U.C.C. § 9-507(1).
23 The secured party who, during repossession, seizes debtor's property which is not
collateral is subject to damages for conversion. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cole, 503
S.W.2d 853 (Tex. 1973) (held that waiver of a debtor's claim to contents of
repossessed automobile if he made no demand within 24 hours after repossession was
void as against public policy). Cf. Klingbiel v. Commercial Credit Corp., 439 F.2d
1303 (10th Cir. 1971) (debtor recovered from secured party $770. as general damages
and $7,500. punitive damages for wrongful repossession); Ferraro v. Pacific Fin.
Corp., 8 Cal. App. 3d 339, 87 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1970) (debtor recovered from secured
parties general damages or $2,812. and punitive damages of $33,000. for wrongful
repossession); Goetz v. Security Indus. Bank, 508 P.2d 410 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973)
(where the court sustained the trial court's award to a third party whose tools and
parts were in repossessed truck when bank refused to return them to the third party);
Northside Motors, Inc. v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1973); Buie v. Barnett First
Nat'l Bank, 266 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1972).
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Since the Code does not define "breach of the peace" the courts have
applied common law definitions in the few cases arising under the
section.2 4 Thus, in an interesting New York case25 the secured party, a
bank, gained access to the defaulting debtor's business premises by means
of a duplicate key made by a locksmith at the bank's request. The security
agreement contained the usual provision that in the event of default the
bank had the right "to enter the... premises... where any of the collateral
may be located and take and carry the same...with or without legal process."
At the time of the bank's entry a court order existed for the sale of the
debtor's assets. It was argued that the unauthorized entry by the bank's
employees was a breach of the peace and the taking of possession of the
collateral was, therefore, a conversion. The court dismissed this argument
stating that "there was nothing in what they did that disturbed public
order by any act of violence, caused consternation or alarm, or disturbed
the peace and quiet of the community." 26 And when a secured party took
possession of an automobile under the terms of the security agreement
after the debtor refused permission and informed the secured party to
proceed by court action, a court held that there was no wrongful taking
or trespass since no breach of the peace occurred.27
However, whatever distinctions Section 9-503 makes between
repossession by self-help and by judicial process, the fact is that the remedy
of self-help has been subjected to constitutional attack in a large number
of jurisdictions following the advent of the well known United States
Supreme Court decisions: Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.28 decided

in 1969, and Fuentes v. Shevin29 decided in 1972. The holdings of
these two cases and, more importantly, their rationale, became the
spearhead in the continuing assault on the constitutionality of the remedy
of self-help under Section 9-503.
Sniadach held that the Wisconsin pre-judgment garnishment procedure
24

See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 966-69 (1972), where the authors discuss the essential requirement

that repossession be peaceful and also what constitutes a breach of the peace. Secured
parties are well-advised not to break into unoccupied homes. See Morris v. First Nat'l
Bank and Trust Co., 21 Ohio St. 2d 25, 254 N.E.2d 683 (1970); 2 G. GILMORE,
SECURITY INTERESTs IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.1 (1965).

Cf. Thompson v. Ford

Motor Credit Co., 324 F. Supp. 108 (D.S.C. 1971) (where the court held no breach
of the peace occurred where repossession of automobile in parking lot did not cause
any "excitement").
25
Cherno v. Bank of Babylon, 54 Misc. 2d 277, 282 N.Y.S.2d 114 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
26 Id. at 281, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 120. Cf. Wirth v. Heavey, 4 CCH SEC. TRANS. GUmE
52,346 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (where the court held that the secured party's breaking

the lock of the defaulting debtor's door was not a breach of the peace since the
secured party was lessor of premises under lease and debtor's default under lease gave
secured party the right to forcibly enter premises to which he is entitled to possession).
27 Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Ditton, 4 CCH SEC. TRANs. GuE
52,319 (Ala. 1974).
28 395 U.S. 337 (1969).

2407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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which permitted garnishment of a defendant's wages prior to trial at
the ex-parte request of the creditor's lawyer was a violation of due
process under the fourteenth amendment because the garnishment
procedure did not afford the debtor notice and hearing prior to
garnishment. 0 The significance of Sniadach was that for the first time
the court established a requirement for a due process hearing before
property could be seized by pre-judgment attachment.
In Fuentes, Pennsylvania and Florida pre-judgment replevin statutes
authorizing the issuance of a writ directing the sheriff to seize secured
property were challenged. The Supreme Court stated the issue before them
to be "whether procedural due process in the context of these cases
requires an opportunity for a hearing before the state authorizes its agents
to seize property in the possessionof a person upon application of another."3 '
The court emphasized the active participation of the state agents and,
stating that its holding in Fuentes was a very narrow one, declared:
The constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of the duty of
government to follow a fair process of decision-making when it
acts to deprive a person of his possessions. The purpose of this
requirement is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual.
Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect 'his use and possession
from arbitrary encroachment-to minimize substantively unfair or
mistaken deprivations of property, a danger that is especially great
when the State seizes goods simply upon the application of and for
the 'benefit of a private party. So viewed, the prohibition against the
deprivation of property without due process of law reflects the high
value, embedded in our constitutional and political history, that we
place on a person's right to enjoy what is his, free of governmental
interference.3 2
Thus, the Supreme Court held that due process under the fourteenth
amendment required that a debtor under such circumstances be given
notice and opportunity to 'be heard before he is deprived of his
property interest, even though 'he does not have full title to the goods
at the time of repossession.
In reaching its decision in Fuentes, the Court in a four-to-three
decision 33 rejected the creditor's view that consideration of the costs
in time, effort, and expense imposed by the requirements of a prior
hearing should outweigh a constitutional right because, the court said,
3
"the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency." '
so 395 U.S. at 342.

911407 U.S. at 80.
32 ld. at 80-81.
33 Justice Stewart wrote for the majority (Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall
concurring). Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion, concurred in by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun. Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate in
the decision.
34 407 U.S. at 90 n.22.
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The Court reasoned that the requirements of procedural due process
are "not intended to promote efficiency or accommodate all possible
interests," but rather "to protect the particular interests of a person
whose possessions are about to be taken." 3
The Court also rejected the creditor's view that default by a debtor
could be considered an "extraordinary situation" that could justify
postponing notice and opportunity to be heard. Expanding on the
Sniadach interpretation, the Court concluded that outright seizure of
a person's property was permitted in only a few limited situations
of unusual nature, such as those serving an important governmental or
general public interest. 36 This litmus test has been met in situations
37
where the state sought to protect the public from contaminated food,
39
38
misbranded drugs or to meet war needs.
In the emerging body of case law involving the constitutionality of
Sections 9-503 and 9-50440 which has developed since the first decision on
that issue in 1971, the constitutional validity of the self-help remedy has
often been decided on the presence or absence of state action sufficient
to invoke the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment 4 ' of the
Constitution of the United States, which provides in part, ".... [NIor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law;...,"42 While an overwhelming majority of cases
have upheld the constitutionality of Sections 9-503 and 9-50443 a few

35 Id.
36ld. at 91.
37

North Amer. Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
38 Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
39
Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921).
4
o See notes 43-44 infra.
41
See note 43 infra.
4
2Northside Motors, Inc. v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617, 620 (Fla. 1973).
43 Bichel Optical Lab., Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906, 907 (8th Cir.
1973) (court stated: "It is our view that the State of Minnesota by the mere passage
of the Article 9 'self-help' remedies has not so significantly involved itself in the
procedures followed by appellee bank as to constitute an act under color of state law
giving rise to a [42 U.S.C.] Section 1983 action"); Kinch v. Chrysler Credit Corp.,
367 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (court held no "state action" involved in
self-help repossession); Baker v. Keeble, 362 F. Supp. 355 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (court
held repossession was a private act and not "state action" within the civil rights statute
because secured party was not aided by any governmental official in repossessing);
Colvin v. Avco Fin. Services, Inc., 12 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 25 (D. Utah 1973); Pease
v. Havelock Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972); Greene v. First Nat'l
Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972); Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F.
Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Kirksey v. Thelig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972);
Northside Motors, Inc. v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617, 622 (Fla. 1973) (court held
"that self-help repossession by a creditor does not constitute state action [Section
9-503] is no more than a codification or restatement of a common law right and a
contract right recognized long before the promulgation thereof and creates no new
rights."); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (1972);
Kipps v. Cozens, 11 U.C.C. REp. SERV. 1067 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1972). Cf. Mojica v.
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courts have declared those sections unconstitutional." Thus, the decisions
are in conflict and as one court correctly prophesied, the questions
concerning the constitutionality of self-help "are before long going to be
45
placed before the United States Supreme Court."
4
McCormick v. First National Bank, 6 was the first reported case in
which a debtor challenged the constitutionality of Section 9-503 under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The debtor purchased an
automobile from an auto dealer under a purchase money security
agreement which the dealer assigned to the defendant bank. After the
debtor allegedly defaulted in his payments the secured party repossessed
the automobile without prior notice.

The debtor, relying on Sniadach, claimed, inter alia, that his
automobile was repossessed under color of state law and he was thus
deprived of his property without due process in violation of the fourteenth
amendment. The court rejected this argument by holding the repossession
was a remedy the secured party had under the security agreement and
that by exercising this remedy it was acting independently under the
47
agreement and was not acting under color of state law.
The most significant case since then was Adams v. Egley,48 which is
49
now pending before the United States Supreme Court. That decision
and 9-504
9-503
Sections
embodying
statute
declared the California
unconstitutional as a violation of the due process clause under the
fourteenth amendment. In that case pursuant to the security agreement
the debtors' cars were seized and sold by the secured party without notice
or an opportunity to be heard before the seizure. The debtors urged the
court to take federal court civil rights jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section
1343(3)50 and to grant substantive relief under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.51
Automatic Employees Credit Union, 363 F. Supp. 143 (N.D. IMl.1973); (court
dismissed the action bocause plaintiffs were found, on-the facts, not to have standing
to' raise the issue of constitutionality of sections 9-503 and 9-504; inasmuch as
plaintiffs alleged repossession in violation of the state's statutes).
4
4Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub nom, Adams v.
S. Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1974); Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F.
Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 4 CCH SEc. TRANS. GUmE 52,401 (3d Cir. 1974);
James v. Pinnix, 4 CCH SEc. TRANS. GUIDE 52,172 (S.D. Miss. 1973), rev'd 4 CCH
52,385 (5th Cir. 1974); Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust
SEc. TRANS. GumE
Co., Civil No. 72-3299 (D. Mass., Aug. 15, 1973), summarized at 42 U.S.L.W. 2116
(1973); Michel v. Rex-Noreco, Inc., 12 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 543 (D. Vt. 1973);
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Dinitz, 11 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 627 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972).

Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1, 5, 295 A.2d 402, 405 (1972).
46 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
47 Id. at 606.
48 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
49 Cert. docketed, No. 73-1842 (June 7, 1974).
50 See note 51 infra.
51 To establish jurisdiction in federal court under § 1343(3) and § 1983 the plaintiff
must show "that the action in question was 'under color of state law' and also that
45
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They claimed that the constitutional right of due process under the
fourteenth amendment entitled them to have their rights judicially
determined before being deprived of a significant property interest. The
secured party argued that the repossession was accomplished by private
parties pursuant to a contract clause in the security agreement and that no
state action was involved. The court rejected the secured party's argument
holding that the presence of Sections 9-503 and 9-504 has a "significant
impact" 52 on the contents of the contract provisions because one contract
made specific reference to the Code and another granted the secured
party "immediate possession... according to law" r upon default. The
court found that secured parties were "persuaded or induced to include"' '
repossession clauses by the fact that repossession was authorized by
statute and concluded that Sections 9-503 and 9-504 set forth the state's
authorization of self-help by repossession and the cited contract clauses
"are merely an embodiment of the policy."
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, reversed.se The court
stated that the two controlling questions of law are: (1) whether the
repossession of collateral by self-help on default under a contract providing
for such repossession is an act accomplished under color of state law, and
thus state action within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, and
(2) whether Sections 9-503 and 9-504 are unconstitutional as state action
which authorizes summary repossession without affording due process. 57
The court, in holding that there was no significant state action
involved when the secured party exercised its right of self-help, stated:
The objective finding that the creditors inpart acted with knowledge
of and pursuant to state law is but one element of the action taken
under color of state law requirement; alone it is not sufficient. The
test is not state involvement, but rather is significant state involvement. Statutes and laws regulate many forms of purely private
activity, such as contractual relations and gifts, and subjecting all
behavior that conforms to state law to the Fourteenth Amendment
could emasculate the state action concept. Further inquiry needs to
be made into the relationship -between creditors and the State to see
whether the State is significantly involved or entangled in the
challenged repossessions or whether mutual benefits are conferred
such action deprives plaintiff of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States." Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 22
(N.D. Cal. 1972).
52 338 F. Supp. at 617.
5Id.at 617.
54Id.

5Id. at 618.
w Adams v. S. Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1974) (as modified on
denial of rehearing).
57Id.at 328.
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which would lead to a finding of a "symbiotic relationship" between
creditors and the State ....
58(emphasis added).
The court in finding no "significant state involvement" reasoned that
in self-help cases the enactment of Sections 9-503 and 9-504 did not
reverse the law as it had been prior to the enactment of the Code but
merely codified existing law for the most part, noting that this is particularly true for the creditor's remedy of self-help repossession. Furthermore,
the court recognized that these creditors' remedies were based on
economically reasoned grounds of very long standing, "which appear to
have been the topic of extensive research and legislative investigation. ' 59
The court rejected the debtor's contention that "the Code provisions
clothe secured parties with the authority of state law" stating that the
creditors were not "working in active concert with state officials" 60 in
the course of self-help repossession. Moreover, the court also rejected the
debtor's contention that the creditors were performing a function or service
that would otherwise in all likelihood be performed by the state by noting
that "a strong case can be made that it is a tradition that repossession is
not a state function, and that the creditor was invoking a private remedy
rather than a state power which has been delegated to him."' 61
The circuit court decision in Adams was explicitly relied upon by
a United States District Court in a different circuit in Johnson v.
Associates Finance Inc., 62 which held that repossession by private parties
was not "state action" giving federal court civil rights jurisdiction. The
court based its decision on its recognition that:
[S]tates have authorized self-help repossession in deference to
historical continuity and because the practice is adjudged to be
economically beneficial for the bulk of creditors and debtors alike.
The persons who thoughtfully and meticulously drafted the Uniform
Commercial Code were not attempting to circumvent constitutional
guarantees. Rather, they intended to permit private persons to decide
whether or not to continue the practice of self-help repossession and
thereby leave to them the ability to regulate, in some small degree, the
cost of borrowing money. Thus, state power, in a sense, was
withdrawn and private decision-making substituted therefor by
Section 9-503 and Section 9-504. Under these circumstances, this
63
court can perceive no action in this case ....
A review of all the cases involving the constitutionality of self-help
repossession reveals that many courts upholding constitutionality have
58 Id.at 330-31.

5Id. at 333.
60 Id.at 338.
61 Id. at 336.
62

365 F. Supp. 1380 (S.D. Il. 1973).

6 Id. at 1381-82.
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postulated their decision on a finding that the state's involvement is
there is no "color of law" under which
only passive and therefore
64
the secured party acts.
It is submitted that the Supreme Court will declare self-help
repossession constitutional in view of the compelling combination of
reasons cited in the various cases upholding constitutionality.
THE SECURED PARTY'S RIGHT TO COLLECTIONS
Possession of the collateral after the debtor defaults is easy to
accomplish when the collateral is tangible property, such as equipment,
inventory and consumer goods. However, when the collateral is intangible
personal property, such as accounts receivable and chattel paper, the
secured party has nothing tangible to take into his possession. Therefore,
his ability to realize on intangible collateral depends on his right to collect
the proceeds of such intangible collateral. When the secured party and
debtor use accounts receivable as collateral they will almost always use a
security agreement which will provide for a "non-notification accounts
65
receivable financing arrangement." Under the arrangement the secured
party will not notify the debtor's customers of the debtor's assignment of
the customers' accounts receivable. Moreover, the secured party will
allow -the debtor to collect these accounts receivable, which is permitted
by Section 9-205, and then remit the collections (usually in original
the proceeds of the
specie) to the secured party which represents
66
collateral to which the secured party is entitled.
After default, the secured party may be able to take possession of all
mail received by the debtor pursuant to the standard provision contained
in such security agreements. In that way he takes possession of all
67
and can
payments received by the debtor from his account debtors
endorse all checks to his own order pursuant to the security agreement.
However, for obvious reasons, he will generally prefer to notify the
account debtors directly and inform them that their accounts have been
previously assigned to him and that payment should therefore be mailed
directly to him. To enable him to do so, the Code gives him this extremely
In Baker v. Keeble, 362 F.2d 355, 357 (M.D. Ala. 1973), the court held, "...selfhelp repossession has long been recognized as a valid private remedy and § 9-503 is
not a sudden intervention." Adams v. S. Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th
Cir. 1974); Maybugh v. Bill Allen Chevrolet, 371 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1973);
Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972); Kirksey v. Thelig,
351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972); Green v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp.
672 (W.D. Va. 1972); Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
Colvin v. Avco Financial Services, 12 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 25 (D. Utah 1973).
65See generally Greenberg, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing, 1956 U.
ILL. L.F. 601, 617-618 (1957).
64

66

U.C.C.

§ 9-306.

An "account debtor" is defined under U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (a) as "the person who is
obligated on an account, chattel paper or general intangible." The words "contract
right" were deleted by the 1972 amendments.

67
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important right to obtain collections by giving him the right to notify
the account debtor to make payment to him after the debtor's default
even if he has not reserved this right in the security agreement.
Thus, Section 9-502(1) provides:
When so agreed and in any event on default the secured party is
entitled to notify an account debtor or the obligor on an instrument
to make payment to him whether or not the assignor was theretofore
making collections on the collateral, and also to take control of any
proceeds to which he is entitled under section 9-306.
Furthermore, under the standard "non-notification accounts receivable
financing arrangement" and this Code section the secured party is given
the right to compromise and settle claims against the account debtors as
well as charge back to the debtor any uncollectible accounts. The debtor
remains liable for any deficiency if the total collections are not sufficient
to repay the loan. 68 Thus, what the secured party does when he settles and
collects these various accounts may adversely affect the debtor because the
debtor will continue to be liable for any deficiency as well as be entitled to
any surplus. 69 Therefore, to protect the debtor's interest during this most
important phase, the Code provides that when the secured party collects
the proceeds of such collateral, either before or after default, he must do so
in a "commercially reasonable manner." Thus, Section 9-502(2) provides:
A secured party who by agreement is entitled to charge back
uncollected collateral or otherwise to full or limited recourse against
the debtor and who undertakes to collect from the account debtors or
obligors must proceed in a commercially reasonable manner and may
deduct his reasonable expenses of realization from the collections. If
the security agreement secures an indebtedness, the secured party
must account to the debtor for any surplus, and unless otherwise
agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency. But, if the underlying
transaction was a sale of accounts, contract rights, or chattel paper,
the debtor is entitled to any surplus. or is liable for any deficiency
only if the security agreement so provides.
The "reasonable expenses of realization" which the secured party
may deduct from the collections will generally include reasonable
attorney's fees and other costs reasonably incurred in enforcing collection
against the account debtors. 70 In requiring the secured party who
undertakes to collect from the account debtors or obligors to proceed
"in a commercially reasonable manner," the Code imposes a fair standard
of conduct for the protection of the debtor.
The paucity of cases challenging the right of the secured party to
assert his rights under Section 9-502(1) after the debtor defaults, with
68

Id. at 330-31.

69 Id.

701d. Florida First Nat'l Bank v. Fryd Constr. Corp., 245 So. 2d 883 (Dist Ct. App.

1971).
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respect to notifying account debtors to make payment directly to
him and taking control of proceeds, suggests that this section is
working well in actual practice.
THE SECURED PARTY'S RIGHT TO RETAIN THE COLLATERAL
Once the secured party has taken possession of the collateral
by self-help or through judicial process, he must comply with other
provisions of the Code.71
The Code provides, with one important exception (relating to certain
consumer transactions discussed hereafter), that the secured party may
propose to retain the collateral in complete satisfaction of the debtor's
obligation by giving written notice of such proposal to the debtor and,
except in the case of consumer goods, to any other secured party who has
a security interest in the collateral evidenced by a financing statement or
who is known by the secured party to have a security interest in the
collateral. 72 In such a case, Section 9-505(2) provides that if the debtor
or other secured party does not object within 30 days from the receipt of
notification, the secured party may retain the collateral in addition to all
payments previously received. If the debtor or certain other secured parties
having a security interest in the same collateral make timely objection
to the secured party's retention of the collateral then the secured party
73
must dispose of the property. This section is frequently employed,
74
according to one writer, to dispose of unregistered securities when
public sale under Section 9-504(3) would be difficult.
The reason for this rule is set forth in the Official Code Comment
to this section:
Experience has shown that the parties are frequently better off
without a resale of the collateral; hence this section sanctions an
alternative arrangement. In lieu of resale or other disposition, the
secured party may propose under subsection (2) that he keep
the collateral as his own, thus discharging the obligation and
75
abandoning any claim for a deficiency ....
The 1972 Official Text has made some important and useful changes
in this area. First, the waiting period is reduced to a maximum of 21 days
calculated from the time written notice of proposal to retain the collateral
is "sent" (not when it is received) until written objection is "received"
(not when it is dispatched). Secondly, the new Text requires that notice
App. 3d 97, 308 N.E.2d 301 (1974).
71 U.C.C. § 9-504; Hildner v. Fox, 17 Ill.

U.C.C. § 9-505(2). This section has been revised by the 1972 Official Text of Article
9 and is discussed infra.
72
73

Id.

Coogan, The New U.C.C. Article 9, 86 HAuv. L REv. 477, 521 (1973). See, e.g.,
SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied sub nom. Santa
Monica Bank v. SEC,-364 U.S. 819 (1970).
75 U.C.C. § 9-505, Comment 1.
74
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of the proposal to retain the collateral be sent only to other secured parties
from whom the secured party has received written notice of a claim of
an interest in the collateral, before the secured party has sent notice
of his proposal to the debtor, or before the debtor's renunciation or
76
modification of his rights, whichever occurs first. Thus, the time for
objection is shortened and the period for giving an objection is stated
in terms of being received by the creditor, rather than the date the
person was notified of the intention to retain the collateral.
Under Revised Section 9-505(2), if the secured party proposing to retain
the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation receives a written objection
within the 21-day period, from a person entitled to receive notification, he
must dispose of the collateral under Section 9-504. Otherwise, his proposal
is deemed accepted and he becomes the owner of the collateral.
However, the exception to the rule which allows the secured party at
his option to retain the collateral in full satisfaction of his claim against
the debtor, in the absence of written objection from the debtor and other
secured parties, occurs when a debtor has purchased consumer goods 7
and has paid 60 percent of the price or 60 percent of the debt. In this case
Section 9-505(1) provides for compulsory disposition of the goods.
The obligation of the secured party to make a compulsory disposition
of the consumer goods cannot be disclaimed or avoided in the security
agreement. However, the Code recognizes that after default the debtor
may agree in writing to modify or renounce his right to compulsory
disposition of the consumer goods. The rationale of this rule is that it is
frequently in the debtor's interest to make this agreement after default
because it permits the secured party to retain the consumer goods in full
satisfaction of his claim while discharging the debtor from any liability
for any deficiency. Otherwise, compulsory disposition may not produce
sufficient net proceeds to satisfy the obligation and the debtor would be
liable for the deficiency. Of course, if there is compulsory disposition then
the secured party must deliver any resulting surplus of money or collateral
to the debtor. 78 Compulsory disposition of consumer goods must be made
within 90 days after the secured party has taken possession of the
consumer goods. The disposition may be by public or private sale and
79
must, like all dispositions, be made in a commercially reasonable manner.
While there appear to be no reported decisions contesting the secured
party's right to retain the collateral in full satisfaction, a number of cases
have raised the question whether and under what circumstances a secured
party's delay in disposing of the collateral after repossession might be
76The policy reasons for this important change are discussed in detail in the text

accompanying notes 98-100 infra.
t
7

See note 134 infra.

U.C.C. § 9-504(2).
79 U.C.C. § 9-504(3).
78
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judicially held to be a proposal to retain the collateral in full satisfactionover the objections of the secured party. An examination of these cases
reveals that courts answering this question have concluded without
difficulty that unreasonable delay in disposition constitutes retention of
the collateral in full satisfaction.80
THE SECURED PARTY'S RIGHT TO DISPOSE OF THE COLLATERAL
As noted in the previous section, the secured party may retain the
collateral in full satisfaction of his claim against the debtor unless the Code
compels disposition of the collateral, or the debtor, or other secured party
having a security interest in the collateral, duly objects in writing. 8'
However, when disposition of collateral is made, whether mandated
or voluntarily made, Section 9-504 prescribes the judicial parameters
within which the secured party must act. That section provides in part:
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose
of any or all of the collateral in its then condition or following any
commercially reasonable preparation or processing....
(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private
proceedings and may be made by way of one or more contracts.
Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at
any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of the
disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms
must be commercially reasonable....
The theme of this entire provision is to afford the secured party
the widest possible discretion and flexibility in disposing of the collateral
to insure that the maximum amount of money will be realized from
the disposition, as long as the secured party acts in a commercially
reasonable manner.82
In setting forth the framework of disposition, Article 9 rejects the
common pre-Code requirement that all dispositions be by public sale
S0Bradford v. Lindsey Chevrolet Co., 117 Ga. App. 781, 161 S.E.2d 904 (1968)
(retention of repossessed car without sale, without excuse for not selling, and without
demand for payment under contract for a period of approximately 50 days before suit
on the contract and for over 16 months from the time of filing suit to the time of
trial); Brownstein v. Fiberonics Indus., Inc., 110 N.J. Super. 43, 264 A.2d 262 (1970);
Northern Fin. Corp. v. Chatwood Coffee Shop, Inc., 4 U.C.C. REP. SEaRv. 674 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. 1967); cf. Harris v. Bower, 266 Md. 579, 587, 295 A.2d 870, 874 (Ct. App.
1972) (the court recognized the principle, noting that "Some courts... seem to have
held that a written proposal may not be absolutely essential, especially where the
secured party conducts himself in a manner so unfair or so unreasonable as to
amount to a retention of the collateral on satisfaction of the obligation." However, the
court did not allow full satisfaction but rather allowed the debtor a credit equal to
the fair market value of the security when repossessed.).
81See text accompanying notes 73-80 supra.
82 U.C.C. § 9-504, Comment 1. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose Indus, Corp.,
280 F. Supp. 698 (E,D. Pa. 1968), af'd, 398 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1968),
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3
after giving notice of the time and place of the sale. Moreover, under
the collateral
before
period
this section there is no required waiting
can be disposed of. 84 The reason for abandoning this pre-Code policy
is set forth in the Official Code Comment to this section:
... Although public sale is recognized, it is hoped that private sale
will be encouraged where, as is frequently the case, private sale
through commercial channels will result in higher realization on
collateral for the benefit of all parties. The only restriction placed
on the secured party's method of disposition is that it must be
commercially reasonable ....

Private dispositions, as expected, are sometimes challenged as commercially unreasonable in view of the supposedly advantageous benefits of a
8
public sale. Thus, in a leading case 6 the debtor objected to a private sale
of collateral consisting of the stock of a radio station, arguing that a private
sale was not commercially reasonable. The court approved the sale over
the debtor's objections stating that such a sale was "amply justified in view
of the evidence concerning the unique nature of the assets underlying the
7
collateral, i.e., a radio station." The court noted that the secured parties
expressly relied upon thoroughly experienced advice from a large media
broker that "a private or negotiated" sale would produce the highest price
for the stock of a radio station. A public or "semi-private" sale of limited
bidding was rejected by the secured parties because of S.E.C. problems.
While -theoverwhelming number of dispositions will be by outright
sale of the repossessed collateral, the Code expressly provides that the
88
secured party may also "lease or otherwise dispose" of the collateral.
While no reported cases have construed the term "otherwise" or challenged
a disposition by "lease" litigation may be expected in this area.
Finally, it should be noted that under this section the secured party
89
may dispose of collateral "in its then condition." Thus, in a leading case,
the secured party sold the repossessed collateral consisting of trucks and
parts which were "in exactly the same condition in which they had been
90
The debtors complained that some trucks
repossessed -from [debtors]."
were in need of repair which was not performed. Although the
inference was that a higher price would have been realized after
repair, the court, in the absence of proof, rejected the debtor's claim
83U.C.C. § 9-504. The pre-Code decisions relating to notice and posting in public
places are collected in 90 A.L.R.2d 1210 (1963) and supplemental material.
84 U.C.C. § 9-504(3).
85 U.C.C. § 9-504, Comment I.
88 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose Indus. Corp., 398 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1968).
87 Id. at 312.
88 U.C.C. § 9-504(1).
89 Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc. v. Sherman Indus. Equip. Co., 316 F. Supp. 435 (E.D.
Mo. 1970).
pOId. t 444,

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1975

17

Akron Law Review, Vol. 8 [1975], Iss. 1, Art. 1

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:1

stating that the secured party was entitled to sell the repossessed
equipment at public auction in the condition in which it was repossessed,
and it had no obligation to repair or repaint. 91
Yet, the secured party while in possession of repossessed collateral
and pending disposition may not do any affirmative act which might
depress the value of the collateral, 92 and where he does so he may be
held to be acting in a commercially unreasonable manner. 93
In making disposition of the collateral the secured party must
act in a commercially reasonable manner. What the standard means
and how the secured party complies with this essential requirement
will be discussed in the sections that follow.
THE SECURED PARTY'S DUTY TO GIVE REASONABLE
NOTICE OF DISPOSITION OF THE COLLATERAL
The pre-Code law frequently required that elaborate public notice of
sale be given one or more times in newspapers of general circulation
or that notice be posted on the courthouse bulletin-board in the area
where the public sale was to be held. 94 This requirement served no useful
purpose in a largely urban society since few interested persons attended
such public sales and those who did frequently were professional buyers
who generally did not compete with each other. The Code, in recognition
of the deficiencies inherent in a mandatory public sale, provides that the
secured party may, at his election, dispose of the collateral by public
or private disposition. Thus, in giving the secured party the right to
proceed, at his election, by private or public disposition, the Code
gives him flexibility and discretion, subject to the litmus test that the
chosen method of disposition must be "commercially reasonable." 95
However, when a secured party disposes of the collateral by private
disposition he must comply with Section 9-504(3):
[R]easonable notification of the time after which any private sale
or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the
secured party to the debtor, and except in the case of consumer
goods to any other person who has a security interest in the collateral
and who has duly filed a financing statement indexed in the name
91 d. at 445.
92 Finance, Inc., v. Haltiwanger, 258 S.C. 330, 188 S.E.2d 472 (1972) (jury held that
secured party decreased value of repossessed machine prior to sale by replacing winch
and other parts of machine with defective parts).
93
Harris v. Bower, 266 Md. 579, 295 A.2d 870 (1972) (where court said that
repossessed yachts "if not carefully and constantly maintained, depreciate at a ruinously progressive rate. [Secured party] permitted this to happen (over period embracing
two full boating seasons] and this seems to us to be not only not commercially
reasonable but to be also utterly lacking in common sense.") See also U.C.C. 9-504,

Comment 6.
94

Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 1210 (1963) and supplemental material,

95 U.CC. § 9-504(3).
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of the debtor in this state or who is known by the secured party to
have a security interest in the collateral....
The notice of any intended private disposition is not required to state
the date of disposition but only the date after which the private disposition
will be made. 96 Moreover, the notice must be sent not only to the debtor
but also to other persons having a security interest in the collateral who
have filed a financing statement or are known to the secured party, except
where the collateral is consumer goods. 97 In this respect the 1972 Official
Text substantially changes the rule concerning the persons entitled to
notice of a proposed disposition under Section 9-504(3). Under Revised
Section 9-504(3) the junior secured party who wishes to receive notice of
disposition of collateral must inform the senior secured party of his interest
in writing before the senior secured party sends notice to the debtor of the
proposed disposition or the debtor waives or renounces his own right to
be sent notification. If the junior secured party does not do so before
either event occurs he is not entitled to notice of disposition. The effect
of this important change is to shift the burden of giving notice to other
secured parties from the secured party to the debtor.
The policy reason for this important change was set forth by
the Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code in its "Reasons
for 1972 Change" which stated:
[The original 1962 text of 9-504] meant that the secured party had to
search the records in every case of notice of sale, to ascertain whether
there were any other secured parties with financing statements that
might be deemed to cover the collateral in question. Moreover, he
ran the risk that some informal communication by letter, or even
orally, might be deemed to have given him knowledge of the interest
of that other party. These burdens of searching the record and of
checking the secured party's files were greater than the circumstances
called for because as a practical matter there would seldom be a
junior secured party who really has an interest needing protection in
the case of a foreclosure sale. Therefore, a change is made requiring
notice to persons other than the debtor only if such persons had
notified the secured party in writing of their claim of an interest in
the collateral before he sent his notification to the debtor or before the
debtor's renunciation of his rights .... 99
96 d. Wheeless v. Eudora Bank, 4 CCH SEC. TRANS. GUIDE

52,384 (Ark. 1974)

(where court held that knowledge of repossession does not equate with notice of sale,
nor does knowledge that an automobile will eventually be sold.)
97U.C.C. § 9-504(3). Usually borrower is the "debtor." Where, however, the borrower
obtained a loan from secured party and offered as collateral an automobile owned by
a third party, it was held that borrower was not a "debtor" within meaning of
9-105(d) and, therefore, was not entitled to the notice of disposition of the collateral
as provided in 9-504(3). See, e.g., New Haven Water Co. Employees Credit Union
v. Burroughs, 6 Conn. Cir. 709, 313 A.2d 82 (1973). For an interesting case involving
effect of failure to give notice to lienholders see note 129 infra.

98 U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1972 revision).
99 U.C.C. § 9-504(3), Appendix (1972).
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When the secured party disposes of the collateral by public sale,
Section 9-504(3) requires that he give "reasonable notification of the
time and place of any public sale" to the same parties as in the case
of a private disposition. 10
The Code defines "notification" as "taking such steps as may be
reasonably required to inform... in the ordinary course,"''1 1 whether
or not the notice is actually received.
Assuming, however, the secured party gives the debtor notice of the
intended disposition of the collateral, the question remains whether
the notice meets the Code's requirement of "reasonable notification."
This is a question of fact, not of law. 10 2
Although the Code states the conditions under which a person
"notifies"' 0 3 another, or "gives"'' 4 or "sends" 10 5 a notice, and when a
person "receives"' 06 a notice'0 7 it does not define "reasonable notification."
However, Section 9-504, Comment 5 states:
"Reasonable notification" is not defined in this Article [Secured
Transactions]; at a minimum it must be sent in such time that persons
entitled to receive it will have sufficient time to take appropriate
steps to protect their interests by taking part in the sale or other
disposition if they so desire.
Thus, the secured party who allows too little time between the sending
of notice and the disposition of the collateral does not give "reasonable
notification." In a recent case' 05 notice of a private sale to be held on
April 10, 1971, was mailed to the debtor on April 7, and received by him
on April 8. April 9 was a holiday. The collateral was sold on April 10.
The court affirmed the trial court's decision that the secured party failed
to give reasonable notification as required in Section 9-504(3) .'
Although security agreements frequently provide that five days'

100 The 1972 Official Text changes in the rule concerning the persons entitled to notice
of a proposed disposition apply whether the disposition is public or private. See text
accompanying notes 95-96.
101 U.C.C. § 1-201(26).
10
2In re Zsa Zsa Limited, 352 F. Supp. 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
103 U.C.C. § 1-201(26).
104
105

Id.
U.C.C. § 1-201(38). CI. Crest Investment Trust, Inc. v. Alatzas, 264 Md. 571, 287

A.2d 261 (1972) (where court said that receipt or acquisition of actual knowledge by
oral notice within the time a properly sent notification could have arrived amounts to
compliance with 9-504[3]). Contra, Foundation Discounts, Inc. v. Serna, 81 N.M. 474,
468 F.2d 875 (1970) (where court held oral notice not in compliance with Code).
106 U.C.C. § 1-201(26).
107 U.C.C. § 1-201(25). The notice may be given in the form of a letter. See, e.g.,
Hawkins v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 250 Md. 146, 242 A.2d 120 (1968).
10S Prairie Vista, Inc. v. Casella, 12 II. App. 3d 34, 297 N.E.2d 385 (1973).
109 Id.
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notice of disposition may be given it is submitted that this may be too
short a time especially where a Saturday or Sunday or holiday fall within
the five-day period. To avoid the potentially successful claim that such
five-day notice is not "reasonable notification" the secured party would be
well advised to extend the time to ten days or at a minimum to seven days.
Assuming reasonable notification of disposition is given, the question
remains whether such notice must be received by the debtor or other
appropriate secured party to be effective notice. There is no Code
requirement that the debtor receive the notice."10 Consistent with this
rule, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held"' that the secured party
satisfied the Code's requirement that "reasonable notification ... shall
be sent by the secured party to the debtor.. ." when the secured party
sent notice by certified mail to the debtor even though the debtor did
not read the notice until after the sale. The court held that more than
a week's notice of the proposed sale was reasonable notification even
though the mail was held for the debtor by the post office until about
two weeks after the sale when the debtor finally called for his mail. The
court correctly stated: "Notification is defined as the taking of such steps
as may be reasonably required to inform the person to be notified,
'whether or not such other actually comes to know of it.' "n
However, a secured party who sends notice of sale of repossessed
collateral to a debtor by certified or registered mail will have a legal
problem in satisfying the Code's notice requirements if the letter is
returned "unclaimed."
The problem was presented in an interesting 1974 Georgia case.'1
The secured party's letter setting forth notice of sale of repossessed
collateral was addressed to the debtor at his last known address and was
sent by certified mail with return receipt requested. The letter was returned
to the secured party marked "unclaimed" by United States Postal Service.
The sale took place almost four months after the notice was mailed." 4 The
secured party moved for summary judgment for the deficiency after the
sale was held. The trial court granted the motion, but it was reversed on
appeal because there was no indication as to whether the unclaimed letter
was returned before the sale. The court held that if the letter was returned
before the sale, then the secured party did not act in good faith in holding
the sale. The court rejected the secured party's contention that the requirement of reasonable notification was met when it wrote the letter regardless
of whether or not it was received, saying that once the secured party had
notice that the letter was not received by the debtor, it had the obligation
110 U.C.C.

§ 1-201(38). See note 105 supra.

Lt Hudspeth Motors, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 238 Ark. 410, 382 S.W.2d 191 (1964).
112 Id. at 411, 382 S.W.2d at 192.
13 Geohagen v. Commercial Credit Corp., 130 Ga. App. 828, 204 S.E.2d 784 (1974).
U4 Id. at 829, 204 S.E.2d at 786.
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to act in good faith in the enforcement of its rights. The court stated:
The documents in the record show that the notice was returned
marked "unclaimed" rather than "refused," but we cannot determine
from the record whether the notice was returned prior to or after the
sale. If returned prior to the sale, as would appear to be the case
from the length of time elapsing between mailing and the sale, we
would be constrained to hold that [secured party] had not in good
faith performed its obligation in disposing of the collateral.1u
Unfortunately, the court did not state what the secured party should
have then done under the circumstances to give "reasonable notification"
of the sale of the repossessed collateral. It is submitted, however, that when
the secured party sends notice of disposition by certified mail or registered
mail, he should send a copy of his notice 'by regular mail at the same
time. If the certified mail or registered mail is returned "unclaimed" or
"refused" -but the copy sent by regular mail is not returned then the
secured party has satisfied the Code's requirement of sending reasonable
notification, since the secured party does not have to prove that the
notice was received. However, if all letters are returned by the Postal
Service marked "unclaimed" or "refused" then the secured party has a
problem for which the Code does not provide a solution since no
provision is made for constructive notice. No reported cases on this
question have been found.
Although the Code requires "reasonable notification" of the sale or
other disposition of the collateral to be given to the debtor, under Section
9-504(3) the secured party must also inform the debtor of the "time and
place of any public sale or ...the time after which any private sale or
other intended disposition is to be made.... ." The failure of the secured
party to comply with -this simple requirement of stating the time, date and
place of the intended disposition resulted in the only reported decision on
this point that the sale was not commercially reasonable. 6 In that case the
secured party's letter to the debtor stated "This is to notify you that your
repossessed car will be put up for bids and sold to the highest bidder. If
7
you wish to make arrangements or bid on the car, call us immediately.''
Thereafter, the secured party advertised the sale of the automobile in
the local newspaper and sold the automobile to the highest bidder. The
court in holding that the notice was defective stated:
25 Id. Accord, Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. & Loan Corp., 57 Tenn. App. 106, 415
S.W.2d 347 (1966).
116 Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Reed, 4 CCH SEC. TRANS. GUIDE 52,244 (Iowa 1973).
17 d. Cf. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Wallgast, 4 CCH SEc. TRANS. GumE 52,382
(Wash. App. Div. 1974) (court held that notification of private disposition was
insufficient "since the notification did not specify the time after which the private sale
was to be made." However, court held that sale made in a "commercially reasonable
manner" and therefore did not bar secured party from recovering the deficiency from
the debtor.).
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The trial court determined the letter indicated a prospective private
sale thereby necessitating reasonable notification of the time after
which the sale would occur. Yet [secured party] in fact conducted a
public sale as the car allegedly was advertised in the local newspaper.
Accordingly, reasonable notification of the time and place of the
sale should have been sent to [debtor]."'
While "reasonable notification" of disposition is mandated by the
Code, some courts have held that a debtor has waived his right to
reasonable notice of disposition or is estopped from claiming a violation
of the Code where a debtor has voluntarily surrendered the collateral to
the secured party and given written notice of election to rescind the
secured transaction. 119

WHEN THE SECURED PARTY

Is NOT REQUIRED

To GIvE NOTICE OF DISPOSITION
It is not always practical or wise to require that the secured party
give notice to the debtor and other appropriate secured parties of his
intended disposition of the collateral. The Code recognizes this and thus
provides that such notice is not required if: ". . . collateral is perishable
or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily
sold on a recognized market...."m
Thus, when any of the three conditions apply to the collateral the
secured party may dispose of the collateral without notice immediately
or at any other time. Whether any of the conditions apply to the
121
collateral is a question of fact.
An extremely important commercial question coming before the
courts frequently is whether collateral consisting of used cars "is of a type
customarily sold on a recognized market" within the meaning of Section
9-504(3). If so, then the Code requirement of notice to the debtor is
dispensed with and the secured party may buy the used cars at private
sale. 122 All courts presented with this issue to date have held that used cars
2
and thus the
are not "a type customarily sold on a recognized market,"'
118 Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Reed, 4 CCH SEC. TRANS. GUIDE %52,244 (Iowa 1973).

119 Nelson v. Monarch Inv. Plan, Inc., 452 S.W.2d 375 (Ky. 1970); Commercial Credit
Corp. v. Wallgast, 4 CCH SEC. TRANS. GUIDE q 52,382 (Wash. App. Div. 1974); Grant
County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972).
120 U.C.C. § 9-504(3).

I1 See, e.g., Wheeless v. Eudora Bank, 4 CCH SEC.

TRANS. GUIDE

52,384 (Ark.

1974.).

§ 9-504(3).
52,384 (Ark. 1974);
1M Wheeless v. Eudora Bank, 4 CCH SEC. TRANS. GUIDE
Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Reed, 4 CCH SEC. TRANS. GUIDE 52,382 (Wash. App. Div.
1974); Norton v. Natl Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966);
Community Management Ass'n, Inc. v. Fousley, 505 P.2d 1314 (Colo. App. 1973);
Turk v. St. Petersburg Bank and Trust Co., 281 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1973); Nelson
v. Monarch Inv. Plan, Inc., 452 S.W.2d 375 (Ky. 1970); One Twenty Credit Union v.
12= U.C.C.
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secured party must send the debtor reasonable notification of the intended
disposition. One court, in contrasting the used car market with a
"recognized market" stated:
We cannot approve the bank's contention that a used car falls in this
category. [A type customarily sold on a recognized market]. Obviously
the Code dispenses with notice in this situation only because the
debtor would not be prejudiced by the want of notice. Thus a
"recognized market" might well be a stock market or a commodity
market, where sales involve many items so similar that individual
differences are nonexistent or immaterial, where haggling and
competitive bidding are not primary factors in each sale, and where
the prices paid in actual sale of comparable property are currently
available by quotation .... What one 1957 Oldsmobile sells for does
not fix the amount a different one may bring ....
And another court rejecting the application of "recognized market" to
used cars stated:
The observation by the court below, in its opinion, is well put. "It is
indeed questionable whether there is a 'recognized market' for used
automobiles. No other article of commerce is subject to more erratic
vacillation in pricing procedures. The so-called 'redbook' purporting
to fix prices of various makes and models of automobiles in accordance with their year of manufacture is adopted for the convenience
and benefit of dealers and is not based on market prices which are
arrived at in the open, based on asking prices of sellers and bids of
prospective buyers." Notice, as required by the [Code,] should
have been given.IE
The question of whether the sale of automobiles, repossessed from
a defaulting automobile dealer, at an "automobile auction" was a
"recognized market" was raised in a recent case. 26 The court held
that automobile auctions should not be construed as a "recognized
market" under Section 9-504(3). The court stated:
Although such auctions do not present some of the evils intended to
be prevented by the statute, it seems reasonable to limit the definition
of "recognized market" to widely recognized stock and commodity
exchanges which are regulated in some substantial way. This will
prevent nearly all of the evils while imposing only a slight notice
burden on creditors in order to obtain their deficiency judgments." z
And in one of the few reported cases involving perishable collateral,
where a secured party repossessed and disposed of collateral consisting of

Darcy, 40 Mass.

App. Dec. 64, 5 U.C.C. REP. SERv. (Mass. App. 1968); Alliance
Discount Corp. v. Shaw, 195 Pa. Super. 601, 171 A.2d 548 (1961).
U24 Norton v. Natl Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966).
1

MAlliance Discount Corp. v. Shaw, 195 Pa. Super. 601, 604, 171 A.2d 548, 550
(1961).

l' Turk v. St. Petersburg Bank and Trust Co., 281 Sc 2d 534 (Fla. 1973).
I=1 Id. at 536.
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meat processed from carcasses without giving any notice to the debtor, a
court held that the collateral was "perishable" and thus 28excused the
secured party from complying with the notice requirements.Yet, in another case 29 when the secured party attempted to excuse
itself from giving notice of disposition to a junior lienholder when it sold
cattle, by claiming that the cattle were "perishable" or threatened "to
decline speedily in value," the court rejected the argument. The court
noted that the cattle were reported to be in "good general condition" by a
veterinarian who tested them for disease, and that the lapse of two weeks
betwen repossession and sale would have been ample time for notification
to be given to the junior lienholder. As a result of its failure to give notice
30
of disposition to the junior lienholder the secured party lost its priority.
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO GIVE REASONABLE NOTIFICATION
UPON SECURED PARTY'S LIABILITY TO DEBTOR
Section 9-507(1) sets forth the secured party's liability to the debtor
when he fails to comply with any of the Code's requirements. In such
event, the debtor's rights are determined by whether or not the secured
party has disposed of the collateral. Where disposition of the collateral
by the secured party has not yet occurred and it is judicially established
that the secured party is not proceeding in accordance with the Code, the
debtor may initiate legal proceedings wherein "disposition may be ordered
or restrained on appropriate terms and conditions."''
The Official Code Comment to this section explains the rationale
of this rule by stating:
The principal limitation on the secured party's right to dispose of
collateral is the requirement that he proceed in good faith (Section
1-203) and in a commercially reasonable manner. See Section 9-504.
In the case where he proceeds, or is about to proceed, in a contrary
manner, it is vital both to the debtor and other creditors to provide a
remedy for the failure to comply with the statutory duty. This remedy
will be of particular importance when it is applied prospectively
before the unreasonable disposition has been concluded. This Section
therefore provides that a secured party proposing to dispose of
collateral in an unreasonable manner, may, by court order, be
restrained from doing so, and such an order might appropriately
provide either that he proceed with the sale or other disposition
128 United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 4 CCH SEC. TRANS. GUIDE %52,273

(D.C.

Wyo. 1973).
129 United States v. Mid-States Sales Co., 336 F. Supp. 1099 (D.C. Neb. 1971).
130 Id. at 1104.
13 U.C.C. § 9-507(1). See, e.g., Dopp v. First Natl Bank, 461 F.2d 873 (2d Cir.
1972); Riblet Tramway Co. v. Monte Verde Corp., 453 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1972);
Lamp Post Restaurant, Inc. v. Greater Island Commercial Corp., 329 N.Y.S.2d 342
(1972); Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Peterson, 7 Wash. App. 196, 498 P.2d 884 (1972);
Note, 39 MARQ. L. REV.246, 265 (1956).
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under specified terms and conditions, or that the sale be made by
a representative of creditors where insolvency proceedings have
been instituted ....
13
However, when disposition has already occurred without Code
compliance, it is too late to obtain a court order restraining or ordering
the disposition on appropriate terms and conditions. In that event the
Code affords relief to the injured party by expressly providing that:
... the debtor or any person entitled to notification or whose security
interest has been made known to the secured party prior to the
disposition has a right to recover from the secured party any loss
caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of this Part .... 133
There have been few reported decisions where a debtor has recovered
from a secured party "any loss" which exceeded the balance owed by the
debtor to the secured party. However a substantial jury award given to a
debtor against a secured party was affirmed on appeal in the leading case
34
of Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation.
In that case the secured party repossessed the defaulting debtor's
entire automobile inventory and sold it without the required notice of
sale being given to the debtor. Although he was in default, the debtor
claimed that the secured party gave him reason to believe that an
additional loan would be made despite the existing default. The debtor
claimed he relied on this assurance and did nothing further to cure
the default. The court sustained a jury award of $55,000 as compensatory
damages stating that the jury's evaluation of the loss caused by the
secured party's failure to give notice of sale was justified since the debtor's
automobile dealership was destroyed.us
In every case where the debtor seeks to recover "any loss" caused by
the secured party's noncompliance with Code requirements the debtor has
the burden of proving his loss.us Furthermore, in cases where the collateral
is consumer goods,"3 the Code provided the debtor with an additional
remedy against a secured party who fails to comply with the Code's
requirements. Thus, in such cases, even though the debtor has not incurred
any loss he "has a right to recover in any event not less than the credit
service charge plus ten percent of the principal amount of the debt or the
132U.C.C. § 9-507, Comment 1.

= U.C.C. § 9-507(1).
134222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963), modified on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846
(3d Cir.1964).
13 Id. at 700.
136 Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963),
modified on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964).
T

13 U.C.C.§9-109(1)

states that goods are "consumer goods" if they are used or

bought for use "for personal, family or household purposes." Thus, ordinary household
products would be classified by the Code as consumer goods. An automobile would
also be a consumer good if its intended use was for personal or family purposes.
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time/price differential plus ten percent of the cash price . . ."138 This
additional remedy is provided because in consumer transactions a
consumer-debtor is not likely to have actual damages. Even when he does,
the amount recoverable is likely to be consumed by the excessive costs
of proving such damages. The potential for abuse of the default provisions
was the underlying reason for the adoption of a statutory penalty. This
penalty affords a protective remedy in many situations in which the
consumer-debtor would otherwise be without a meaningful remedy.
In one reported case the interesting question was raised whether a
consumer-debtor could recover a double penalty in an action against
a secured party who failed to sell the repossessed automobile within
90 days after repossession and failed to give the debtor notice of the
disposition. The secured party's noncompliance violated both Section
9-504(3) and Section 9-505(1). The court held that the debtor could

not recover a double penalty.L
The Code's inclusion of this additional remedy awarding punitive
damages to a consumer-debtor was intended to be a deterrent to secured
parties who might otherwise escape liability for noncompliance with
the Code's requirements because of the consumer-debtor's difficulty
in proving actual loss. Thus, the statutory minimum penalty serves as

a prophylactic device affording the debtor protection and encouraging
Code compliance by the secured party.140

EFFECT OF FAILURE TO GIVE REASONABLE NOTIFICATION
UPON SECURED PARTY'S RIGHT TO RECOVER
DEFICIENCY FROM DEBTOR
The more frequently reported Code decisions involving the legal

effect of the secured party's failure to give the debtor reasonable
notification of the disposition of collateral have arisen in actions by
1 41

the. secured party against a debtor to- recover a, deficiency- judgment

13 U.C.C.§ 9-507(1). Under this provision the debtor could recover a substantial

amount where default occurs after only a few payments. Concerning this possibility
Gilmore has noted: "If repossession took place before much has been paid the
recovery of 10 per cent plus the financing charges could perfectly well exceed
the payments. In such a case, at least, the Code provision would amount to a real
penalty." 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTEREST IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.9.3 (1965).
139 Special protection without proof of loss is not novel to the Code, nor were such
benefits limited to consumer sales in prior acts. The UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES
ACT, Section 25, allowed the buyer to recover "from the seller his actual damages, if
any, and in no event less than one-fourth of the sum of all payments which have been
made under the contract, with interest." This penalty had limited effectiveness. See
2A UNmFORM LAws ANNOT. § 129, at 181 (1924).
1402 0. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, § 44.9.3 (1965).
14 1

In general, "deficiency" is that part of a secured obligation which remains after

the original debt is credited with net proceeds realized from the sale of the collateral
by the secured party. Thus, a deficiency judgment is a judgment or decree for that
part of a secured debt not realized from the sale of the collateral. See Okmugee
Motor Sales Co. v. Prentice, 371 P.2d 723 (Okla. 1962).
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This type of action is more common than an action by a debtor to
recover "any loss" which involves the debtor meeting the difficult burden
of proof of loss imposed by Section 9-507.
The question, succinctly stated, is whether a secured party can
recover a deficiency judgment from a debtor when he has not complied
with Code requirements concerning notice of disposition of collateral. The
discussed
Code does not expressly answer the question nor is this question
142
Rather, a
in the Code comments or in its unofficial commentaries.
careful reading of Section 9-507(1) discloses that the injured debtor can
recover "any loss" from the secured party when the latter does not comply
with the Code's notice requirements. Of course, the debtor would have the
14
burden of proving his loss. Yet, despite the absence of express Code
authority on the specific question, a majority of courts have reasoned that
the secured party who fails to comply with the Code's notice requirements
is subject not only to the liability provided by Section 9-507(1) of paying
the "any loss" incurred by the debtor but also to an additional penalty, the
loss of the right to recover any deficiency from the debtor.'"
Some courts have embraced the majority view by simply concluding
that Code compliance is a condition precedent to recovery of any
deficiency. 14 Other courts have followed the majority view based on the
rationale that the secured party's noncompliance with the Code's notice
requirements has precluded the debtor's exercise of his right of
redemption. As stated in the leading case of Skeels v. Universal C.I.T.
1
Credit Corp.:'
...It is conceded in this case that no notice whatsoever was given
to [debtor] at the time the cars, new and used were sold. There was
simply no compliance by defendant with this Section [9-504] of the
Uniform Commercial Code.... [Tio permit recovery by the security
holder of a loss in disposing of collateral when no notice has been
given, permits a continuation of the evil which the Commercial Code
sought to correct. The owner should have an opportunity to bid at
the sale. It was the secret disposition of collateral by chattel mortgage
owners and others which was an evil which the Code sought to
GILMORE, SEcurInY INTEREST IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1264 n.8 (1965).
Hansen & Sons, Inc. v. Crowley, 57 Wis. 2d 106, 203 N.W.2d 728 (1973).
144 Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963),
modified on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964); Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan,
27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1972); Braswell v. American Nat'l Bank,
117 Ga. App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420 (1968); Foundation Discounts, Inc. v. Serna, 81
N.M. 474, 468 P.2d 875 (1970); Leasco Data Process Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt
Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Civ. Ct. 1971); Aimonetto v. Keepes, 501
P.2d 1017 (Wyo. 1972).
'45 Geohagen v. Commercial Credit Corp., 130 Ga. App. 784, 204 S.E.2d 784 (1974);
Twin Bridges Truck City, Inc. v. Halling, 205 N.W.2d 736 (Iowa 1973); Camden
Nat'l Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329 (Me. 1973).
146222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963), modified on other grounds. 335 F.2d 846
(3d Cir. 1964).
1422

G.

143 Vic
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correct. It is important to note in the instant case that there was no
waiver of the right to notice on disposition of collateral. A security
holder who disposes of collateral without notice denies to the debtor
his right of redemption which is provided him in Section 9-506. In
my view, it must be held that a security holder who sells without
notice may not look to the debtor for any loss .... 147
Yet, other courts following the majority rule have reasoned that
there is a rebuttable presumption that the collateral was equal in
value to any deficiency when the secured party does not comply
with the Code's notice requirements. 148 This reasoning was expressed
in a leading case 149 where the court stated:
We think the just solution is to indulge the presumption in the
first instance that the collateral was worth at least the amount of
the debt; thereby shifting to the creditor the burden of proving the
amount that should reasonably have been obtained through a sale
according to law. 150
Thus, under this reasoning unless the secured party rebuts this
presumption by proving what he obtained without notice was what
he would have obtained by a disposition with notice, he cannot recover
any claimed deficiency. 151 In almost all of the reported cases the secured
party who failed to give notice did not rebut the presumption and
52
therefore could not recover his claimed deficiency.
The minority view, however, permits the secured party to obtain a
deficiency judgment against a debtor even though the secured party did
not comply with the Code's notice requirements. 5 3 The courts following
Id. at 702. Accord, Edmondson v. Air Serv. Co., 123 Ga. App. 263, 180 S.E.2d 589
(1971); Motor Contract Co. of Atlanta v. Sawyer, 123 Ga. App. 207, 180 S.E.2d 282
(1971); Braswell v. American Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga. App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420 (1968).
148 Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87 (Alaska 1969); Norton v. Nat'l Bank,
240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966);* Investors Acceptance Co: of Livingston, Inc.
v. James Talcott, Inc., 454 S.W.2d 130 (Tenn. CL App. 1969).
149 Norton v. National Bank, 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966).
150 Id. at 150, 398 S.W.2d at 542.
1 1
5 See note 152 infra.
152
Barker v. Horn, 245 Ark. 315, 432 S.W.2d 21 (1968); Norton v. Nat'l Bank, 240
Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966); Johnson v. Commercial Credit Corp., 117 Ga.
App. 131, 159 S.E.2d 290 (1968); Gallatin Trust and Savings Bank v. Darrah, 152
Mont. 256, 448 P.2d 734 (1968); Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d
138, 302 N.Y.S. 2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969); Alliance Discount Corp. v. Shaw, 195 Pa.
Super. 601, 171 A.2d 548 (1961). See also Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co. 452 P.2d
87 (Alaska 1969) (court held that secured party rebutted the presumption when it
established that it received "the best available current price for the four dump trucks
after they were sold upon repossession and that the sale was made in a commercially
reasonable manner.") In that case the court was influenced by the fact that the
secured party had obtained written appraisals from Alaskan appraisers, and thereafter
obtained prices from sources in Washington, Oregon and California and finally sold
the dump trucks to the firm making the best offer. The court concluded that the
secured party was entitled to a deficiency judgment against the debtor.
10 Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87 (Alaska 1969); Universal C.I.T. Credit
147

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1975

29

Akron Law Review, Vol. 8 [1975], Iss. 1, Art. 1

AxRON LAw REvIEw

(Vol 8:1

the minority view often consider the commercial reasonableness of the
transaction, noting that lack of notice is one factor to determine whether
the sale was commercially reasonable. They usually hold that the debtor's
sole remedy where reasonable notification is not given is a separate action
by the debtor to recover "any loss" under Section 9-507(1).154
L
Thus, in a case of first impression in Washington,'
electing to follow the minority view stated:

the court in

Under [Section 9-507(1)] if the creditor fails to give notice to the
debtor as required by [Section 9-504(3)], the debtor has a right to
recover from the creditor any loss caused by the failure to give
that notice. Thus, in the instant case if the sale of the tractor without
notice had resulted in a loss to the [debtor], the [debtors] would have
a right in the instant proceeding to claim that loss against the
deficiency sought by the [secured party]. In view of this remedy, we
are of the opinion the writers of the Uniform Commercial Code did
not intend that the creditor's failure to give notice would result in a
I%
forfeiture of the creditor's right to a deficiency ....
In analyzing the merits of the two opposing views, it should be
recognized that the secured transaction places the secured party in a
preferred position compared to unsecured creditors since he can repossess
and sell the collateral for his own benefit without court intervention. In
granting the secured party this invaluable right the Code has attempted to
protect the debtor's interests by requiring that reasonable notification be
sent to the debtor of the intended disposition of the collateral. Since the
Code has validated self-help and minimized the formal requirements of
the disposition it should be incumbent upon the secured party to comply
with Section 9-504(1) relating to reasonable notification. Denial of the
deficiency judgment serves as the most effective means of insuring Code
compliance by the secured party and protecting the debtor's interests
because it has a deterrent effect upon secured parties who disregard
Co. v. Rone, 248 Ark. 665, 453 S.W.2d 37 (1970); Community Management Ass'n
v. Tousley, 505 P.2d 1314 (Colo. App. 1973); Cornett v. White Motor Corp., 190
Neb. 496, 501, 209 N.W.2d 341, 344 (1973) ("No sound policy requires us to inject
a drastic punitive element into a commercial context."); T. & W. Ice Cream, Inc. v.
Carriage Barn, Inc., 107 N.J. Super. 328, 258 A.2d 162 (1969); Mallicoat v. Volunteer
Finance & Loan Corp., 415 S.W.2d 347 (C.A. Tenn. 1966); Grant County Tractor
Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972).
52,
154 See, e.g., Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. Howard, 4 CCH SEC. TRANS. GUmE
308 (City Ct. N.Y. 1973) ("A meritorious defense against a deficiency judgment
gained under section 9-504 [subd. (3)] as stated is precluded by relief under the
proper sections of the Uniform Commercial Code.").
155 Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972).
156 Id. at 869, 496 P.2d at 969. The court cited with approval one commentator's
analysis that the injured debtor's remedy is provided in 9-507. See Hogan, Pitfalls in
Default Procedures, 86 BANKING L.J. 965, 978 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Hogan].
See also Posel, Sales and Sales Financing, 16 RUToEs L. Rev. 329, 346 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Posel].
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debtor's rights in repossessed collateral. 15 7 Therefore, recovery of any
deficiency, it is submitted, should be denied in all cases where the secured
party fails to send the debtor reasonable notice of intended disposition.
On this important question, two of the leading commentators on secured
transactions have reached opposite viewpoints. 5 8
WHAT CONSTITUTES A COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE
DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL AND THE
PENALTY FOR NONCOMPLIANCE
The Code deliberately provides wide latitude, discretion and
flexibility to the secured party engaged in the disposition of collateral
in an effort to achieve maximum economic benefit. 159 However, the
Code mandates that "every aspect of the disposition including the method,
manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable... ."160
Commercially reasonable, although a repeated term in the Code, is not
specifically defined. Rather, the Code defers to case law for the
development of a precise meaning.' 6 '
Since the Code subjects the secured party to liability to the debtor
for "any loss" incurred by the debtor if the secured party does not
comply with the Code, 16 2 the draftsmen of Article 9 set forth some
tests to help determine whether the disposition of the collateral is made
in a "commercially reasonable" manner. Thus, Section 9-507(2) amplifies
the meaning of "commercially reasonable manner" by providing:
The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at a
different time or in a different method from that selected by the
secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish that the same was
not made in a commercially reasonable manner. If the secured party
either sells the collateral in the usual manner in any recognized
market thereof or if he sells at the price current in such market at
the time of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in conformity with
reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of
property sold he has sold in a commercially reasonable manner. The
157Farmers Bank v. Odom, 246 A.2d 85, 88 (DeL Super. Ct. 1968). See also Posel,
supra note 156, at 345.
158 Compare Hogan, supra note 156 with 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN
PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.9.4 (1965).
L59 See, e.g., Hogan, The Secured Party and Default Proceedings Under the Uniform

Commercial Code, 47 MINN. L. R~a. 205, 219-220 (1962) ("the policy of Article 9
is to provide a simple, efficient and flexible tool to produce the maximum amount
from the disposition of the collateral.").
160 U.C.C. § 9-504(3). The provisions of the Code do not apply when a sale of the
collateral is made in execution on a judgment against the debtor since the Code
applies only when collateral is sold under the Code. See, e.g., Citizens Bank v. Perrin
& Sons, Inc., 253 Ark. 639, 488 S.W.2d 14 (1973).
M

I1n Re Zsa Zsa Limited, 352 F. Supp. 665, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), citing 1 CoOGAN,

HooAN & VAoTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER U.C.C., § 8.04(2) (a) (1968).
1H2U.C.C. § 9-507(1).
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principle stated in the two preceding sentences with respect to sales
also apply as may be appropriate to other types of disposition. A
disposition which has been approved in any judicial proceeding or
by any bona fide creditors' committee or representative of creditors
shall conclusively be deemed to be commercially reasonable, but this
sentence does not indicate that any such approval must be obtained
in any case nor does it indicate that any disposition not so approved
is not commercially reasonable.
The duty to make a disposition of the collateral within a reasonable
time and in a reasonable manner is imposed on the secured party to
require him to act diligently to protect the interest of the debtor. The
duty of the secured party who disposes of the collateral is to obtain
the best possible price the secured party could obtain for the collateral,
63
for the benefit of the debtor.
In all cases the overriding factual test is whether the disposition made
or about to be made by the secured party is commercially reasonable. 64
The answer depends on all the facts and circumstances of each case. 165
Since disposition may be by public or private sale, a preliminary
question is what constitutes a public sale. That question was decided in an
interesting case 166 where the debtor contended that the secured party's sale
of the collateral was not a public one. The Code does not define "public
sale" but the court applied the definition of that term as found in the
Restatement of Security as "one to which the public is invited 167
by
advertisement to appear and bid at auction for the goods to be sold."
The court held that the secured party did not conduct a public sale as
required by the Code after it gave the debtor notice of public sale. The
evidence disclosed that the sale of the collateral was not advertised in any
newspaper and no signs were posted announcing the public sale. Moreover,
no one passing the lot where the collateral was kept could have known an
auction was taking place. The court concluded that the sale "was neither
lawful nor commercially reasonable.' 68 The court then concluded that the
163A to Z Rental, Inc. v. Wilson, 413 F.2d 899, 909 (10th Cir. 1969); Vic Hansen &
Sons, Inc. v. Crowley, 57 Wis. 2d 106, 203 N.W.2d 728 (1973); 2 G. GILMORE,
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL. PROPERTY, § 44.5, at 1234 (1965) ("The obligation

on

the secured party is to use his best efforts to see that the highest possible price is
received for the collateral.").

164 The fact that particular conduct is authorized

by

the contract of the parties does

not excuse the secured party from acting with commercial reasonableness in disposing
of the collateral. See, e.g., Empire Life Ins. Co. v. Valdak Corp., 468 F.2d 330 (5th
Cir. 1972).

165 See, e.g., Farmers Equipment Co. v. Miller, 252 Ark. 1092, 482 S.W.2d 805 (1972).
The fact that the sale of the collateral to a buyer is approved by a receivership court
does not in itself establish that the sale was conducted in a commercially reasonable
manner. See also Frontier Inv. Corp. v. Belleville Nat'l Sav. Bank, 119 Ill. App. 2d 2,
254 N.E.2d 295 (1969).
166 In Re Bishop, 482 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1973).
167 Id. at 385, quoting RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 48, commernt c at 140 (1949),
168 Id. at 386.
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secured party was barred from recovering a deficiency judgment. In doing
so the court reasoned that even if the minority rule was followed 169 the
same result would be reached as under the majority rule. 170 The court stated:
Courts that allow a secured creditor to recover a deficiency although
he has not fully complied with the law hold that the debt is not to be
credited with the proceeds of sale; instead, the debtor must be credited
with the amount that reasonably should have been obtained through
a lawful sale-that is, the credit must be equal to the market value.
Logically, the amount of the proceeds is not evidence of the market
value, and a creditor who has not complied with the law has the
burden of proving by other evidence that the market value is less
than the balance due .... 171
The court held that the secured party did not meet that burden because it
did not introduce an appraisal of the property or even evidence of sales of
comparable property. The fact that the collateral, after being bought
in by the secured party, was thereafter sold for $500 more did not prove
that the disposition of the collateral was commercially reasonable or that
the aggregate credit of both sales represented the market value of the
collateral. The court was influenced by the fact that the resale for $500
more did not appear to have been made through a broker or dealer, or
in the usual manner in any recognized market and that72the circumstances
of the resale, including advertising, were not disclosed.
Other cases have considered the question of whether the public sale
was conducted in a commercially reasonable manner as required by the
Code. 73 The method, manner, time, place and terms of a public sale are
often challenged by the debtor who claims that the conduct of the public
sale was not commercially reasonable. Thus, debtors frequently claim that
the public sale was not adequately advertised, and that the public sale was
not therefore commercially reasonable, and thus bars the secured party
from recovering a deficiency judgment as well as entitling the debtor to
recover "any loss" from the secured party. Courts have said that the
secured party must advertise in a manner likely to come to the attention
74
of the class of buyers who would be interested in buying the collateral.
Thus, when a secured party repossessed a yacht and, during the course
of two full boating seasons before selling it, advertised one time in
a newspaper of general circulation and did not list the yacht with a
yacht broker or advertise the sale in a publication read by persons
interested in boating, the court held that the secured party did not act
in a commercially reasonable manner. 7 5
170 Id.
169 Id. at 385.
172 Id. at 386.
171 Id. at 385-86.
173 See notes 174-75 Infra.
174 See, e.g., Harris v. Bower, 266 Md. 579, 295 A.2d 870 (1972).
175 Id. Cf. Eaton, Yale and Towne, Inc. v. Sherman Industrial Equipment Co., 316

F. Supp. 435 (E.D. Mo. 1970) (public sale was commercially reasonable where proper
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Perhaps the most thorough judicial analysis of what constitutes
commercial reasonableness in disposition of collateral by public sale is
found in the leading case of In Re Zsa Zsa Limited.176 The public sale
produced only one bidder whose $300,000. bid for the collateral was
accepted. The collateral had an estimated retail value of 3.5 million
dollars, wholesale value of 1.5 million dollars and cost value of $500,000.
When a hearing was held before the referee in bankruptcy to determine
whether the sale should be confirmed, the trustee in bankruptcy contended
that the advertisement in The New York Times was insufficient in terms
of timing and content; that the size of the lots was too large and their
composition too varied to attract a large buying public; that the boxes
containing the inventory should have been opened for full inspection, and
that the failure of the auctioneer to represent that the inventory lists shown
7
to the bidders were accurate in all respects discouraged active bidding.1 7
The secured party argued that the well-displayed advertisements in
the Times, the provision of eight days' notice before sale, the availability
of inspection for five days, the use of lot bidding as an alternative
method, and the situs of the sale at the warehouse where inventory was
stored were indicators of commercial reasonableness. 78 The court affirmed
the referee's order confirming the sale although the amount received
was "only about 10 cents on the dollar."' 79 The court stated:
It is the aggregate of circumstances in each case-rather than specific
details of the sale taken in isolation-that should be emphasized in a
review of the sale. The facets of manner, method, time, place and
terms cited by the Code are to be viewed as necessary and interrelated
parts of the whole transaction....
The language of section 9-507 reveals that the primary focus of
commercial reasonableness is not the proceeds received from the sale
but rather the procedures employed for the sale. If the secured
creditor makes certain that conditions of the sale, in terms of the
aggregate effect of the manner, method, time, place and terms
employed conform to commercially accepted standards, he should be
shielded from the sanctions contained in Article 9....
The price received, $300,000, falls substantially short of the
estimated alleged retail value in a going concern context, placed in
excess of 3.5 million. A wide discrepancy between the sale price and
the value of the collateral signals a need for close scrutiny... even
though a seemingly low return is usually not dispositive on the

public notice was given, a professional auctioneer conducted the sale, and the
collateral, consisting of trucks and truck parts and accessories, were sold as individual
trucks and as a bulk of accessories.).
176 352 F. Supp. 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
177 Id. at 669.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 671,
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question of commercial reasonableness. Section 9-507. Such scrutiny
is especially appropriate where self-dealing is alleged.1se
Sometimes, rather than a too hasty sale, the secured party, after
repossession, delays the disposition. In such a case the question arises as
to when a delayed disposition becomes a commercially unreasonable
disposition which bars the secured party from recovering any deficiency
as well as subjects him to liability for any loss caused by such delay. Since
the Code does not compel disposition by a specified date after repossession,
except in the case of consumer goods,' 81 case law must be examined.
Thus, one case held that where a secured party retained collateral without
sale and without excuse for not selling and without demand for payment
on the contract, for a period of 50 days before suit on the contract and for
over 16 months from the time of filing suit, the delayed disposition was
commercially unreasonable and the secured party was barred from recov8
ering a deficiency judgment. 182 Other cases have reached the same result.U
When a disposition is challenged by the debtor as not being
commercially reasonable he will often assert that 'the price realized at
the public or private disposition was so inadequate as to constitute a
commercially unreasonable disposition.
Section 9-507(2) anticipates this challenge and affords some, but
not absolute, protection by providing, in part, that: "The fact that a better
price could have been obtained by a sale at a different time or in a different
method from that selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to
establish that the dale was not made in a commercially reasonable
manner." (Emphasis added).
While a discrepancy between a price received at a sale and fair market
value is not alone sufficient for a determination of unreasonableness such
a discrepancy, if substantial, is relevant to a determination of whether a
challenged sale was commercially reasonable.'"
Yet, a substantial discrepancy is not a commercially unreasonable
disposition per se. Thus, when collateral having a fair market value of
approximately $28,000 was sold on a bid for $500 the court said that fact
did not in itself establish that the sale was not conducted in a commercially
reasonable manner. 18 The court relied on the evidence that proper notice
18 Id. at 670, 671 (emphasis by the court).

181 U.C.C. § 9-505(1).
182

Bradford v. Lindsey Chevrolet Co., 117 Ga. App. 781, 161 S.E.2d 904 (1968).

10 Farmers State Bank v. Otten, 204 N.W.2d 178 (S.D. 1973) (where secured party

did not sell until approximately 15 months after repossession); Brownstein v.

Fiberonics Indus., Inc., 110 N.J. Super. 43, 264 A.2d 262 (1970); Northern Fin. Corp.
v. Chatwood Coffee Shop, Inc., 4 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 674 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1967).
184 Application of Bickel, 14 IMI.App. 3d 813, 303 N.E.2d 541 (1973).
185 Sierra Financial Corp. v. Brooks-Farrer Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 698, 93 Cal. Rptr.
422 (1973).
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was given, no fraud or wrongdoing of any kind existed, and the goods
were "distressed" goods, in that the manufacturer had gone out of
business and the exact quantity and condition of the goods could not
be determined at the time, because the objecting party who claimed
the collateral would not release it for purpose of sale.1' 6
The question of whether the secured party may sell repossessed
collateral at "wholesale" rather than "retail" is another related question in
testing the commercial reasonableness of the disposition. This question
was answered in a recent case' 87 where the court correctly noted that
while there is no Code requirement or prohibition that the secured party
sell at "wholesale" or "retail" the secured party has a duty to obtain
the best possible price under the circumstances. Thus, when the secured
party, an automobile dealer, purchased the repossessed automobile at
"wholesale" and credited the debtor with the proceeds and sued the
debtors for the deficiency, the court held that the sale was not commercially
reasonable and barred recovery of a deficiency judgment. The court
rejected the secured party's argument that it "took used automobiles in
at wholesale to sell at retail and make money." The court stated:
Such a practice has no place in a private sale of debtor's collateral
in that the plaintiff, as secured party, owes the duty to the defendant
to use reasonable efforts to obtain the best price to protect the
debtors' interests. The secured party should not "make money" from
the sale of the debtors' collateral. 188
In cases where a debtor challenges, ,by affirmative defense, the
commercial reasonableness of the disposition, there is some conflict
as to who has the 'burden of proof. The majority of cases hold that
the secured party must establish that every aspect of the disposition
was commercially reasonable.189
Courts may be expected to further define the commercially
reasonable disposition on a case-by-case basis since a survey of
the case law reveals that no hard and fast rules can be laid down.
Consequently, the prudent secured party will strive to do everything
reasonable as to the method, manner, time, place and terms of every
disposition he makes after he repossesses the collateral.
THE RIGHTS OF THE PURCHASER OF THE COLLATERAL
Successful disposition of the collateral requires that the purchaser
acquire valid title at the time he buys the collateral at public or private
sale. This desired effect is achieved under Section 9-504(4) which provides:
188 ld.

Vic Hansen & Sons, Inc. v. Crowley, 57 Wis. 2d 106, 203 N.W.2d 728 (1973).
188 Id. at 111, 203 N.W.2d at733.
18 See, e.g., Universal C.I.T. Credit Co. v. Rone, 248 Ark. 665, 453 S.W.2d 37 (1970).
187
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When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the
disposition transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's
rights therein, discharges the security interest under which it is
made and any security interest or lien subordinate thereto. The
purchaser takes free of all such rights and interests even though
the secured party fails to comply with the requirements of this
part or of any judicial proceedings:
(a) in the case of a public sale, if the purchaser has no knowledge
of any defects in the sale and if he does not buy in collusion
with the secured party, other bidders or the person conducting
the sale; or
(b) in any other case, if the purchaser acts in good faith.
Thus, we see a double standard imposed. The purchaser at a public
sale is protected as long as he is not acting in bad faith and is under
no duty to inquire into the circumstances of the sale. However, at a private
sale, where the possibility of collusion between the secured party and the
purchaser is greatest, the purchaser must qualify in all respects as a
purchaser in good faith (honest in fact) to be protected. 190
The Code recognizes that the secured party may wish to buy the
collateral and provides that he may do so pursuant to Section 9-504(3):
".... The secured party may buy at any public sale and if the collateral
is of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or is of a type
which is the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations
he may buy at private sale."
The foregoing rule is salutary because at a public sale the secured
party is often willing to bid for the collateral if the other bids are
insufficient or if there are no other bidders, as is frequently the fact. This
inures to the benefit of the debtor since he continues liable for any
dieficiency and also to the secured party who may choose to own the
collateral rather than receive the meager proceeds resulting from
the public sale. Of course, where the secured party is the only bidder
at the public sale the price he bids will often by challenged by the
debtor as a price which is inadequate. The debtor's claim will usually
be raised as a defense or counterclaim when the secured party seeks to
recover a claimed deficiency. In such cases the fact question to be
resolved will be whether the secured party's disposition of the collateral
at the resultant price was commercially reasonable.' 91
The Code also permits the secured party to buy the collateral in a
190See, e.g., Cooper v. Klopfenstein, 29 Mich. App. 569, 185 N.W.2d 604 (1971)
(court held purchaser acted in good faith and noted that good faith purchaser holds
title to collateral clear of the debtor's right of redemption); 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PRoPERTY § 44.7 (1965) (Professor Gilmore criticizes the

double standard); Hogan, The Secured Party and Default Proceedings Under the
U.C.C., 47 MINN. L. REv. 205, 233 (Hogan criticizes the distinction made between
purchasers at public sales and those at private sales.)
M9'U.C.C. § 9-504(3).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1975

37

Akron Law Review, Vol. 8 [1975], Iss. 1, Art. 1

AUON LAw REviEW

[Vol 8:1

private sale provided the collateral is one of the two types enumerated
in the section. 192 Thus, a purchase made by the secured party of collateral
consisting of registered securities at the price at which such securities
were concurrently sold on the New York Stock Exchange would qualify
under either exception. The rationale of this Code provision is that since
there is a recognized market or standard price quotation for the collateral
the secured party cannot successfully make a bid lower than the market
value since he buys at the "going price." However, in all other instances
the secured party may not purchase the collateral at private sale.
Finally, it should be noted that in any disposition made by the
secured party, the test of commercial reasonableness must be met no
matter who the purchaser is.
APPLICATION OF THE PROCEEDS OF THE
DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL

The Code provides in Section 9-504(1):
...The proceeds of disposition shall be applied in the order
following to:
(a) the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale,
selling and the like and, to the extent provided for in the
agreement and not prohibited by law, the reasonable attorney's
fees and legal expenses incurred by the secured party;
(b) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by the security interest
under which the disposition is made;
(c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate
security interest in the collateral if written notification of
demand therefor is received before distribution of the proceeds
is completed. If requested by the secured party, the holder of a
subordinate security interest must seasonably furnish reasonable
proof of his interest, and unless he does so, the secured party
need not comply with his demand.
Under this section the secured party is authorized to prepare or
process the collateral prior to disposition and to recover the reasonable
expenses of preparing the collateral for sale. Thus, a secured party is
entitled to recover his reasonable expenses if he completes the
manufacturing of work-in-process in a "commercially reasonable" manner.
It should be noted that the secured party shall turn over to the holder
of a suxbordinate security interest in the same collateral the amount
necessary to satisfy the claim of such subordinated secured party "if
written notification of demand therefor is received before distribution of
the proceeds is completed."' 193 And, if the senior secured party requests, the
junior secured party must furnish reasonable proof of his interest. If he
92 Id.
U3 U.C.C.

§ 9-504(1) (c).
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fails to do so, the senior secured party may ignore his demand for payment.
Reasonable proof would include, at a minimum, a copy of the security
agreement signed by the debtor together with a sworn proof of claim.
The secured party must then account to the debtor for any surplus,
and, unless otherwise provided in the security agreement, the debtor is
liable for any deficiency. 194 However, if the transaction covered by the
agreement between the parties was an outright sale of accounts or chattel
paper, then the debtor will not be entitled to any surplus or be liable for
any deficiency unless the agreement provides for such liability.'9
THE DEBTOR'S RIGHTS OF REDEMPTION
It was the philosophy of most pre-Code secured transactions to give
the debtor the right to pay his debt and secure the return of his collateral
if he has previously defaulted and lost possession of the collateral to the
secured party. 196 The rationale of this rule is that no harm is done to
the secured party who receives what is owed to him, while the debtor is
entitled to the return of his property once he has paid his debt. Under
pre-Code law, the Uniform Conditional Sales Act gave the buyer the right
to redeem for only ten days after the conditional seller repossessed the
goods. 9 7 Other pre-Code security devices had different time periods after
which the debtor could not redeem. The Code has not set any time limit
within which the debtor or another secured party having an interest in
the collateral must exercise his right to redeem the collateral. However,
those pre-Code security devices which gave the debtor the right of
redemption also provided that the right would be cut off in specified
cases. The Code has similar provisions. Thus, Section 9-506, unchanged
by the 1972 amendments, provides:
At any time before the secured party has disposed of collateral or
entered into a contract for its disposition under Section 9-504 or
before the obligation has been discharged under Section 9-505(2)
the debtor or any other secured party may unless otherwise agreed
in writing after default redeem the collateral by tendering fulfillment
of all obligations secured by the collateral as well as the expenses
reasonably incurred by the secured party in retaking, holding and
preparing the collateral for disposition, in arranging for the sale, and
to the extent provided in the agreement and not prohibited by law,
his reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses. (Emphasis added).
Thus, the debtor or any other secured party having any interest in
the collateral can redeem the collateral at any time unless the secured
194 U.C.C. § 9-504(3).
1M U.C.C. § 9-504(2). For a discussion of the problems that can arise when subordi-

nated secured parties claim proceeds, see 2 GILMORE, Sscurry INrrErmrs
PERSONAL PRoPERTY § 44.8 (1965).
19
N 1o0m CoNDrrnoNAL SATS AcT, § 18.

IN

IN Id.
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party has effectively cut off that right by: (1) disposing of the collateral;
(2) making a contract of disposition; (3) retaining the collateral in
satisfaction of the secured obligation; (4) making a written agreement
with the debtor or other appropriate secured parties after default. 198
Obviously, protection of the debtor's right of redemption requires that
he be sent notice of disposition of the collateral by the secured party.
Moreover, since the Code specifically provides that a good faith purchaser
for value takes all of the debtor's rights in the collateral whether or not the
secured party has complied with the Code's provisions concerning
disposition, 199 notification is essential to preserve the debtor's rights in the
collateral. 200 While redemption is a right "devoutly to be wished" by the
debtor, most debtors who are in default because of nonpayment of one
or more installments are usually unable to pay the full amount of the
debt which is declared due at such time under the standard acceleration
clause contained in the security agreement and any accompanying
installment promissory note. 20 ' Yet, notification will afford the debtor
an opportunity to seek refinancing even if he is not able to redeem.
What constitutes a "contract of disposition" was discussed in a leading
case, 2 2 where the novel argument was made by a debtor that since a
secured party's contract for the disposition of the collateral could be
avoided by the failure of a condition stated in the contract, the debtor's
right to redeem should not be cut off by Section 9-506. The court noted
that the secured party's contract for disposition of the collateral contained
specific provisions which, had they become operative, would have
permitted the parties to avoid the contract. However, the court stated:
But the provisions in question were not "conditions precedent" in the
sense that either party was equally free to withdraw from the contract
without reason. We are satisfied that prior to the time the petition
for redemption of the collateral was filed the secured parties had
• entered into a contract for its disposition"23within the meaning of
that provision of Section 9-504 of the Code.
In accordance with Section 9-506, if a security agreement contains
an acceleration clause which provides that upon default all sums
198 U.C.C. § 9-506.
199 Id.

200 Notice of disposition, however, is excused where the collateral is perishable, where
it threatens to decline substantially in value, or where it is of a type customarily sold
on a recognized market. See U.C.C. § 9-504(3).
201 See Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure and Deficiency: A Journey to the

Underworld and a Proposed Salvation, 51 ORE. L. REv. 302, 315-316 (1972) (the
author criticizes the Code requirement that the defaulting debtor pay the entire debt
if the secured party exercises his right to accelerate under the usual acceleration
clause).
202 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose Indus. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Pa. 1968),
aff'd, 398 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1968).
203398 F.2d at 313.
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become due and payable at the option of the secured party, then the
right of the debtor to redeem his property is conditioned upon his
making the -following tender:
(a) the amount representing the sum due under the acceleration
clause; and
(b) the amount sufficient to reimburse the secured party for his
reasonable expenses incurred in retaking, holding and preparing
the collateral for disposition, in arranging for the sale and his
reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses.
4
Yet, in one case 2 where the secured party repossessed the debtor's
automobile upon default, and declared the entire unpaid balance due
amounting to $1180.71, the court held that the secured party's refusal of
$900 from the debtor and its subsequent sale of the automobile for $275
was unconscionable and therefore denied the secured party its claim for
205
where the secured party
a deficiency judgment. And in another case
past due payments,
accepted
automobile
after repossession of the debtor's
debtor was entitled
the
that
held
was
it
fee,
repossession
a
and
late charges
to the return of the automobile and the secured party's refusal to return
and amounted
the automobile was not commercially reasonable 2conduct
06
Code.
the
by
proscribed
conduct
to unconscionable
It will be remembered that under Section 9-504(3) the secured party
may dispose of the collateral "by way of one or more contracts" and that
the sale or other disposition of the collateral may be as a unit or in parcels.
Thus, the secured party may make successive sales or other dispositions of
different parts of the collateral in his possession. The fact that he may have
sold or contracted to sell part of the collateral will not affect the debtor's
right under this section to redeem the remaining collateral. In calculating
the amount required to be tendered in "fulfillment of all obligations
secured by the collateral" in addition to the enumerated expenses, the
debtor will receive credit for the net proceeds of the collateral sold.
It should be noted that a debtor may agree in writing to waive
his right of redemption "after default." Although no reported cases
have involved the validity of the debtor's waiver of his right of
redemption before default, it is submitted that any pre-default waiver
207
In one reported case, however, the court said
would be declared void.

204 Urdang v. Muse, 114 N.J. Super. 372, 276 A.2d 397 (1972).
2 Robinson v. Jefferson Credit Corp., 4 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 15 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1967).

206 In allowing the debtor to redeem the collateral, the court ignored 9-506 entirely.
By comparison, courts construing Section 18 of the UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES
AcT (repealed by the Code) have held that a defaulting debtor could redeem by
paying past due installments, plus interest, late charges and expenses instead of the
entire unpaid balance. See, e.g., Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co. v. Nascarella, 39 Misc. 2d
971, 242 N.Y.S.2d 326 (Sup. Ct. 1963). The Code thus changes this rule to the
debtor's disadvantage.
207 Compare Indianapolis Morris Plan Corp. v. Karlen, 28 N.Y.2d 30, 268 N.E.2d
632 (1971) with 2 G. GILMORE, SECuRrrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.3,
at 1220 (1965).
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that a guarantor of a debtor in a secured transaction could validly waive
his right of redemption, as guarantor, before default. 0 8
Although there are very few reported cases where the right of
redemption was sought to be exercised, courts have zealously guarded
this right and have frequently denied a deficiency judgment to a secured
party who has failed to comply with the Code's notice requirements
by holding that failure to give reasonable notification prevented the
2°0
debtor from exercising his right of redemption.
CONCLUSION

We have seen that the Code through its provisions affords the secured
party the flexibility and convenience he requires (1) to swiftly move to
possess his collateral from a debtor in default, (2) to collect from account
debtors and obligors the proceeds of the collateral when the collateral is
accounts receivable or chattel paper, and (3) to dispose of the collateral
by public or private disposition or retain it in satisfaction of the debtor's
obligations. At the same time the interests of the defaulting debtor are
carefully safeguarded by requiring the secured party to give the debtor
reasonable notification of the disposition and an opportunity to redeem.
Moreover, the economic interests of other secured parties who have
a subordinated security interest in the same collateral are also protected
by the Code's provisions. Finally, the provisions for judicial review
of past and future dispositions of collateral by the secured party is
the ultimate safeguard afforded to the debtor and other subordinated
secured parties who believe the secured party 'has not proceeded in
every respect in a commercially reasonable manner.
An examination of the reported cases illustrates that some secured
parties have been careless in complying with the Code requirements and
have thereby incurred the penalties the Code prescribes for noncompliance.
Yet, we have seen that not every challenge by a debtor to the secured
party's conduct has met with success. We may conclude that when a
secured party acts in a commercially reasonable manner, measured by
what a reasonable party acting in good faith should do in the market
place, he will successfully meet the challenge of objecting debtors and
other specified parties. The Code, improved by the 1972 amendments, has
given the secured party flexibility in possessing and disposing of the
collateral while at the same time protecting the economic interests of
the debtor and other subordinated secured parties. Thus, the Code has
balanced the equities fairly and has thereby made an extremely valuable
contribution to the business community it seeks to serve.

20 Indianapolis Morris Plan Corp. v. Karlen, 28 N.Y.2d 30, 268 N.E.2d 632 (1971).
2

Urdang v. Muse, 114 NJ. Super. 372, 276 A.2d 397 (1972).
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